Transparency report: requests for user data
How many requests for user data Private.Ki has received, what kinds we count, and what we could hand over — nothing readable.
This report documents requests from law enforcement, courts and government authorities for information about Private.Ki users. Its purpose is to make invisible pressure visible: even when there is nothing to report, saying so clearly means you never have to guess.
Current status
As of 28 January 2026 (last published):
| Category | Requests received | Complied with |
|---|---|---|
| Requests for account information | 0 | — |
| Requests for message content or metadata | 0 | — |
| Court orders, subpoenas or similar legal demands | 0 | — |
| Requests for interception or monitoring | 0 | — |
| Total | 0 | — |
We have not received any request for user data, metadata, interception or account information. The report is updated when a request is received and reviewed periodically alongside the warrant canary.
What we count
The report aggregates:
- requests from law-enforcement or government authorities, from any country;
- court orders, subpoenas and similar legal demands;
- requests for user data, metadata, account information or technical assistance;
- requests for content interception or monitoring.
We publish counts only — never names, usernames or anything that could identify a user or a requesting party's target.
What we could hand over
Because message content is encrypted on your device and stored only as ciphertext, there is no readable mail or chat on our servers to disclose, regardless of who asks. The complete inventory is in What our server can and cannot see. In summary, a valid request could at most obtain:
- plaintext account fields: username, display name, public key, sign-up date, last sign-in, whether two-factor and a recovery address are set;
- delivery metadata: which addresses an account sent to and when, message sizes and timestamps;
- the encrypted blobs themselves, which are useless without the recipient's private key and passphrase.
It could not obtain message bodies, attachments, voice messages, subject lines of stored mail, passwords, passphrases, private keys or recovery addresses, because we do not hold them in readable form. Nor could it obtain IP addresses or a connection history: we keep no access or connection logs.
Private keys are locked with a passphrase or a device-derived key that never reaches our server. An order to "decrypt" would have no technical means of being carried out — which is the point of the design, and why the warrant canary also covers orders to weaken encryption.
Common questions
What if a request arrives with a gag order?
Then this report cannot mention it. The warrant canary exists for exactly that case: it is renewed monthly, and it going quiet is the only signal we could give.
Do abuse reports count as requests?
No. Reports of spam or abuse from other users are handled under the anti-spam policy and are not government requests. They do not appear in this report.
Where is Private.Ki based?
Private.Ki is not based in the European Union or the United Kingdom. We nevertheless apply GDPR standards to every user — see GDPR compliance.